

# On the Feasibility of Automated Built-in Function Modeling for PHP Symbolic Execution

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## ABSTRACT

Symbolic execution has been widely applied in detecting vulnerabilities in web applications. Modeling language-specific built-in functions is essential for symbolic execution. Since built-in functions tend to be complicated and are typically implemented in low-level languages, a common strategy is to manually translate them into the SMT-LIB language for constraint solving. Such translation requires an excessive amount of human effort and deep understandings of the function behaviors. Incorrect translation can invalidate the final results. This problem aggravates in PHP applications because of their cross-language nature, *i.e.*, the built-in functions are written in C, but the rest code is in PHP.

In this paper, we explore the feasibility of automating the process of modeling PHP built-in functions for symbolic execution. We synthesize C programs by transforming the constraint solving task in PHP symbolic execution into a C-compliant format and integrating them with C implementations of the built-in functions. We apply symbolic execution on the synthesized C program to find a feasible path, which gives a solution that can be applied to the original PHP constraints. In this way, we automate the modeling of built-in functions in PHP applications.

We thoroughly compare our automated method with the state-of-the-art manual modeling tool. The evaluation results demonstrate that our automated method is more accurate with a higher function coverage, and can exploit a similar number of vulnerabilities. Our empirical analysis also shows that the manual and automated methods have different strengths, which complement each other in certain scenarios. Therefore, the best practice is to combine both of them to optimize the accuracy, correctness, and coverage of symbolic execution.

## CCS CONCEPTS

• Security and privacy → Web application security.

## KEYWORDS

PHP; Constraint solving; Symbolic execution

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## 1 INTRODUCTION

Web applications have been one of the primary channels connecting service providers and hundreds of millions of end users. Because of their importance, web applications and their valuable users have been the primary targets of cyber attacks. A study reported that 64% of companies had experienced web-based attacks [42]. A recent report in 2018 also showed that among 43 popular web applications, each web application on average contained 33 vulnerabilities, and the number of those critical vulnerabilities per web application grew by three times compared to the year of 2017 [45].

Due to the popularity and critical uses of web applications, the detection of their vulnerabilities has been an active and important research topic in the past decades. In particular, symbolic execution uses multiple symbolized inputs to test certain program properties, and is proven to be effective in detecting vulnerabilities and testing their exploitability with the advances in constraint-satisfiability theory [15]. It has been applied to multiple program analysis tasks in the OS kernel [17, 39], browsers [10], *etc.* In web applications, prior studies have applied symbolic execution to detect SQL injection (SQLi), cross-site scripting (XSS), remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities [2, 44], *etc.*

A general challenge in symbolic execution is handling language-specific built-in functions. Such built-in functions are commonly used to provide basic operations like string processing, arithmetic, and bit manipulation, *etc.* Therefore, a correct understanding of the function semantics and overall program logic requires the analysis of built-in functions. However, to generate concrete solutions to determine the reachability and exploitability further requires precisely modeling their behaviors for constraints solving. As a common strategy, prior works model a small number of built-in functions into SMT-LIB language [43] for constraint solving and ignore the other ones [2, 30]. Such a modeling process is expensive, as it typically requires an excessive amount of human effort and the domain knowledge of the function behaviors. Manual models can also be error-prone, and lead to false results (both false positives and false negatives) in vulnerability detection and exploitation. For

example, incorrect modeling can bring soundness problems that a true positive case can be classified as a negative [11, 47].

Unlike some languages (*e.g.*, C) whose built-in (library) functions are written in the same language, PHP, as a dynamic language, however, implements its built-in function in a static language—C. Such a cross-language nature poses many challenges for precisely modeling these built-in functions in symbolic execution. For example, some language features (*e.g.*, operators and type systems) are inconsistent between the two languages. Some operators in one language might not exist in the other, making it hard to understand the behaviors of built-in functions using such operators.

In this paper, we aim to explore the feasibility of automatically modeling built-in functions for PHP symbolic execution. We face several challenges. First, the cross-language nature renders the modeling very hard. To the best of our knowledge, there exists no automated tool for modeling PHP built-in functions yet. Second, it is hard to achieve a high *coverage* of the built-in functions. There are a large number of built-in functions in a programming language, with different function definitions. An automated method shall be able to support many of these built-in functions. Third, it is difficult to achieve an acceptable *correctness*. A built-in function can be designed for several tasks. Under different arguments, the behaviors and results can be different. Inaccurate modeling can lead to invalid execution results.

We propose a cross-language program synthesis method to automate the built-in function modeling. We make use of the C implementations of PHP built-in functions to understand their behaviors. In particular, we first convert the constraint solving task in PHP symbolic execution into a C program and integrate the C implementations of built-in functions. We then employ a C symbolic execution engine to solve the task. We propose a type inference algorithm and a syntax mapping method to overcome the challenges posed by the language feature inconsistency in the cross-language integration. Because the synthesized C program retains the semantics of the original PHP constraint solving task, the solutions of the C symbolic execution can be applied to the PHP symbolic execution. We thus achieve the goal of automatically modeling PHP built-in functions.

We implement our methodology into XSYM and plan to release the source code. We successfully apply it to automatically model 287 PHP built-in functions. We demonstrate that the models can accurately represent the internal semantics of the built-in functions and achieve similar performance as the ones modeled by experts. With the help of XSYM, we can exploit 141 vulnerabilities in the evaluation dataset. Compared with XSYM, a state-of-the-art manual modeling tool can exploit 133 vulnerabilities using the same constraints collected in PHP symbolic execution. XSYM further exploits 13 vulnerabilities that cannot be exploited by the manual modeling tool. Our manual verification shows that the manual modeling tool produces wrong results for 27 cases, while XSYM has only two. This suggests that manual modeling can be error-prone and can cause soundness bugs.

We further thoroughly characterize our automated modeling and the manual modeling for PHP built-in functions. Compared with manual methods that are *modeled on demand* and *specialized*, our automated method achieves a higher *coverage* and *correctness*. It can be easily applied to most of the in-scope built-in functions

and achieve a high accuracy. We find that our automated method can even be used as a means for verifying the correctness of manual methods. We further show that the manual methods and our automated method complement each other as they have different strengths.

In summary, we make the following contributions in this work.

- **A new cross-language function model.** We explore the feasibility of automated modeling of the PHP built-in functions for PHP symbolic execution. We propose a cross-language program synthesis method for PHP applications. To this end, we propose multiple new techniques such as type inference and cross-language syntax mapping.
- **An extensive evaluation.** We demonstrate that our automated method can achieve a high function coverage and correctness. It is also practical in exploiting vulnerabilities—we can exploit 141 vulnerabilities in 26 real-world applications, with fewer false-positive reports and false-negative reports.
- **A thorough characterization.** We summarize the characteristics of manual and automated models. We provide insightful suggestions to guide future modeling of built-in functions.

## 2 BACKGROUND

### 2.1 PHP Symbolic Execution

Symbolic execution is a useful program analysis technique that helps determine the inputs to guide control and data flows. It runs a program with symbolized inputs to check whether certain program properties can be satisfied or violated and has been used in PHP program analysis for various tasks, such as bug detection and test generation [4, 6].

PHP programs are interpreted by a framework—the Zend engine [49]—into Zend bytecode at run time. The Facebook HHVM [36] is a virtual machine that could convert PHP code into its HipHop bytecode through a just-in-time compiler and had stopped supporting PHP since version 4 [28]. To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing tool that can directly perform symbolic execution above the PHP Zend bytecode or HHVM bytecode. Existing symbolic execution frameworks operating on LLVM IR [10, 12–14, 39] cannot be used for PHP, either, because there exists no tool that can fully compile PHP into LLVM IR. Therefore, previous works design their own customized intermediate languages for their PHP symbolic execution. For example, Torpedo [35] and UChecker [30] build their own control flow graphs (CFGs) above the abstract syntax trees (ASTs) generated from PHP-Parser [34]; Navex [2] uses PHP code property graphs in PHP Joern [5] that are initially designed for C programs [48].

During PHP symbolic execution, path constraints, which stand for the conditions of input values that lead to specific locations, are collected to help determine the feasibility of particular execution paths or bugs. By solving path constraints with satisfiability modulo theory (SMT) solvers, a decision can be given to know if a path can be taken or a bug can be triggered. However, SMT solvers cannot directly interpret and understand a class of functions—the uninterpreted functions (*e.g.*, PHP built-in functions). These functions

commonly appear in constraint formulas. The semantics of solver-uninterpreted functions, directly stop a solver from producing a correct solution for any constraint formula that contains them.

Similar to other programming languages, PHP has a large number of built-in (internal) functions. All PHP built-in functions are solver-uninterpreted and thus are not supported directly by the solver. This poses a serious problem for symbolically executing PHP programs and generating tests/exploits. As explained above, the commonly used solver-uninterpreted PHP built-in functions stop us from exploring more paths and finding bugs. Previous works on modeling the solver-uninterpreted functions can be divided into two classes: 1) manually modeling functions based on their definitions and descriptions [2]; 2) concretely executing a function with selective inputs or runtime values [26]. The first method requires to check and understand specific functions, and then “*translates*” the functions to a solver-understandable definition. This requires an excessive amount of human effort and domain knowledge. Because of that, this method can only be applied to a limited number of solver-uninterpreted functions. The second method can create imprecise models of built-in functions by collecting multiple input-output pairs. However, it does not scale as it can cover only very few concrete inputs. Therefore, an automated and accurate approach to modeling the PHP built-in functions is necessary.

## 2.2 Satisfiability Modulo Theories

Satisfiability is the basic and ubiquitous problem of determining if a formula expressing a constraint has a model or a solution [22]. Many problems can be described in terms of satisfiability, including puzzles, program verification, exploit generation, *etc.* It is also a key component in symbolic execution.

SMT solvers check the satisfiability of first-order logic formulas from various theories [9, 22, 47] such as booleans, bit-vectors, strings, *etc.* The SMT-LIB language is the current standard input language for SMT solvers [43]. It supports basic arithmetic and logic operations and is now adopted by the majority of SMT solvers [8]. The SMT solvers can output three decisions for input formulas: 1) SAT if satisfiable, 2) UNSAT if unsatisfiable under any circumstances, and 3) UNKNOWN if they are not able to decide its satisfiability. For the formulas receiving a satisfiable decision, the SMT solvers can provide models (solutions) that satisfy the input formulas with concrete value for each defined variable

To facilitate specifying constraints into SMT-LIB language compatible formulas, SMT solvers provide several necessary built-in functions. However, the number of such SMT built-in functions is limited and their functionalities are restricted. For example, Z3 provides only around 40 built-in functions; some advanced functionalities (*e.g.*, string splitting) are not directly supported with its built-in functions. The analysts thus may have to implement such advanced features on their own. For example, Navex [2] and Chainsaw [1] make use of the SMT built-in functions to model PHP built-in functions for constraints solving.

## 3 UNDERSTANDING MANUAL MODELING

We study the PHP built-in function supports of Navex, a state-of-the-art PHP code analysis tool that is equipped with manual built-in function models [2], to understand how manual models are

constructed. We try to summarize and generalize some common practices in them. We do not study the second class of the solutions mentioned in §2.1, because, to the best of our knowledge, manually modeling PHP built-in functions is the dominant solution to date.

**Constraint relaxation.** Navex models only 35 PHP built-in functions. For compatibility reasons, it chooses to ignore those unsupported built-in functions and thus relaxes the entire constraints to a certain extent. This is a common trade-off design practice that enables the tool to study more cases, but, consequently, can bring side-effects such as wrong satisfiable decisions and wrong solutions. For instance, if the function  $f()$  in constraint formula  $f(\$x) == 1$  is unsupported, Navex regards the term  $f(\$x)$  as unconstrained, resulting in  $\$x$  as unconstrained as well. The SMT solver will give a sample solution for the unconstrained variable  $\$x$ , *e.g.*, 0.

**Functionality simplification.** A built-in function can be designed to perform multiple tasks. However, supporting all the behaviors of a built-in function in SMT-LIB language is non-trivial. Manual modeling might choose to perform *functionality simplification* to cover only a part of the entire functionality of a built-in function. Such a design might potentially cause wrong results, but can also bring the benefits of reducing the complexity of constraints as only part of the function is considered.

## 4 PROBLEM STATEMENT

### 4.1 Research Problem and Research Goals

Symbolic execution requires understanding the behaviors of built-in functions for constraint solving. As introduced earlier, built-in functions are common in PHP applications but are hard to model. The current program analysis tools normally ignore such built-in functions or support only a small number of them through manual modeling. Manual methods usually take an excessive amount of human effort and require a deep understanding of the function behaviors to accurately model them. They can also be error-prone.

In this work, we first aim to explore the feasibility of automating the modeling of built-in functions for PHP symbolic execution. Second, we hope to systematically evaluate the automated models and compare with the state-of-the-art tools, in terms of function coverage, accuracy, and applications. Third, we aim to summarize the lessons we learn in our exploration of an automated method and provide some insightful suggestions to shed some light on future research.

### 4.2 Research Challenges

We face several challenges to automatically model built-in functions for PHP symbolic execution. First, modeling built-in functions requires understanding the behaviors of them. To automate such a process, we need to find a way to understand the behaviors of built-in functions without human efforts, which is technically difficult. To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been well studied yet, as there currently exists no such a tool. Besides, due to the large number of built-in functions, it is hard to achieve a high *coverage*. Prior manual works thus choose to only model those most frequently used ones and ignore the rest. Furthermore, it is also hard to achieve a high *correctness*. Each built-in function may contain diverse functionalities, under different input arguments,




Figure 1: The overall methodology.

different features can be thus enabled or disabled. To achieve a high correctness, the models need to thoroughly support the entire functionality of the built-in functions.

## 5 METHODOLOGY

### 5.1 Overview

We explore the feasibility of automated built-in function (written in C) modeling for PHP symbolic execution with a high *coverage* and *correctness*. As the implementations of PHP built-in functions are available in the PHP interpreter, we can perform symbolic execution on them to understand their behaviors and automate the modeling. However, PHP and C, are two inherently different languages with different language features. It is hard to seamlessly integrate two languages and the two symbolic execution engines for them. Due to the complexity and dynamic nature of PHP, translating the whole PHP language system to another static language is hard or even infeasible [28]. Thus we cannot simply convert the whole PHP application into a C program and employ C symbolic execution. The low-level C implementations of all built-in functions can hardly be converted into a high-level language, PHP, either.

Therefore, we propose to convert only the results of PHP symbolic execution (e.g., constraints) into a C program that equally describes the task in the C symbolic execution. Unlike the whole language system translation, the constraint solving task can be transformed because it contains only a subset of the whole PHP dynamic language features. We then integrate the C program with the implementations of PHP built-in functions. We call the integrated result a *synthesized program*. Afterward, we leverage C symbolic execution on the synthesized C program for constraint solving. Because the synthesized C program retains the original constraint solving task, the solutions generated by the C symbolic execution thus can equally be applied to the original PHP constraints. Relying on the C symbolic execution, we can achieve the automated built-in function modeling.

For the example in Listing 1, to exploit the XSS vulnerability in line 8, instead of converting all the 10 lines of the PHP program, we need to convert only the task of finding a possible solution for the control flow constraint, e.g., `strtolower('phpbb_' . $_GET['uname']) == 'phpbb_root' && $_GET['passwd'] == 'mypassword'` and the data flow constraint, e.g., `$_GET['ann'] == 'alert('XSS')'` collected in PHP symbolic execution. As an example, the synthesized C program is illustrated in Listing 2. Apart from the variable declarations in line 5-7, line 8-9 describe the control flow and data flow in the PHP constraints, where the PHP operators are replaced with the corresponding functions. The C symbolic execution can be directed

```

1 <?php
2 $user = 'phpbb_' . $_GET['uname'];
3 $password = $_GET['passwd'];
4 $announcement = $_GET['ann'];
5
6 if(strtolower($user) == 'phpbb_root') {
7     if($password == 'mypassword') {
8         echo $announcement; // XSS
9     }
10 }
  
```

Listing 1: An XSS vulnerability for demonstration.

```

1 // include built-in function
2 #include "php-built-in.h"
3
4 int syn_pro() {
5     php_string _GET_uname; // to symbolize
6     php_string _GET_passwd; //to symbolize
7     php_string _GET_ann; //to symbolize
8     if(php_is_equal(strtolower(php_concat("phpbb_",
9         _GET_uname)), "phpbb_root") && php_is_equal(
10        _GET_passwd, "mypassword")) { //control flow
11         if(php_is_equal(_GET_ann, "alert('XSS')")) {
12             // data flow
13             assert(0); // synthesized error
14         }
15     }
16 }
  
```

Listing 2: The synthesized program for code in Listing 1.

to the C implementations to analyze and model these PHP built-in functions. We also synthesize an assertion in line 10 so that when the C symbolic execution attempts to find the assertion error, the conditions in line 8-9 are satisfiable, and a set of concrete value assignments to the symbolic variables (e.g., `_GET_uname`) can be provided. The solutions are then applicable to the original PHP constraints and PHP applications.

There are several technical challenges. First, the language inconsistency between PHP and C makes the constraint solving task conversion difficult. PHP is a weakly-typed programming language that can initialize and use variables with assignments, while C, a statically-typed language, requires variable declarations before use. Such type information is thus missing in the PHP code and the constraints. Besides, the constraint solving task contains many PHP operators (e.g., the concatenation in line 8 of Listing 1) that are not defined in C. Second, PHP built-in functions are implemented inside the PHP interpreter and interact with other modules through complex PHP internal APIs. Identifying such APIs and extracting only the built-in functions are challenging. Third, synthesizing a C program to guarantee the PHP constraint solving task is accurately preserved is hard.

We overcome these challenges with a cross-language program synthesis method. The workflow of the overall methodology is presented in Figure 1. To the best of our knowledge, there does not exist a well maintained open-source symbolic execution framework for PHP applications. Also as stated in §2.1, many prior works design their own symbolic execution on their custom intermediate formats. Thus we first design a PHP symbolic execution framework in §5.2. We propose a type inference algorithm to infer the variable types, and a *light-weight syntax mapping* method to handle other PHP

language features (*e.g.*, operators and built-in functions) in §5.3. We seamlessly convert the constraint solving task and synthesize C programs in §5.4. Last, we construct symbolic inputs and leverage a C symbolic execution engine for the synthesized C program in §5.5. The results of the C symbolic execution can be applied to solve the constraint solving task in the original PHP programs.

## 5.2 PHP Symbolic Execution

As stated earlier, there is no open-source framework or standard intermediate format for PHP symbolic execution. We thus take a similar approach as common practices [2, 35] to perform symbolic execution over our custom CFGs constructed from ASTs. Our symbolic execution creates symbolic variables for the inputs, and walks through the CFGs for constraint collections. Next, we briefly describe the key techniques in our symbolic execution.

**5.2.1 Memory Space Management.** Symbolic execution simulates the real execution with symbolic inputs. In our design, we treat all values that are not concrete as symbolic variables. We design dedicated data structures to manage the symbolic variables and the operations above them (*e.g.*, logical operations). The whole memory space of both symbolic variables and concrete values are managed in a global array, `Memory`, which maintains pairs of keys and the corresponding values. The keys are viewed as addresses of variables. We organize a dictionary, `Keydict`, to store the mappings from PHP variables to keys in `Memory`. For assignment statements in the ASTs that initialize new variables, we first create a mapping of the variable name (left side value) and an unused key in `Keydict`. We then store the variable value (right side value) to the corresponding location in `Memory` pointed by the key. Variable value fetches are conducted in a similar but reverse direction. However, we cannot support the cases when the variable name cannot be interpreted given the information provided in `Memory`, *e.g.*, `$$x = 1`; where `$x` is a symbolic variable already, thus `$$x` cannot be determined statically. It is a general challenge of PHP analysis [19], thus we currently do not handle it.

**5.2.2 Constraint Collection.** The CFGs we construct contain mainly two types of nodes: conditional nodes (*e.g.*, `if` statements), and non-conditional nodes (*e.g.*, assignment statements). Conditional nodes usually include the boolean conditions as the prerequisites to execute the statements in the following branches (*e.g.*, the statements in the body of an `if` branch). We collect the conditions in the conditional statements, and interpret them as parts of the path constraints by applying the symbolic values stored in `Memory` to all variables in them. In non-conditional nodes, we update the `Keydict` and `Memory` accordingly. The control flow constraints in the conditional statements determine the reachability of a particular location. Data flow constraints, which usually integrate the relevant variables with some attack payloads, can be also collected to determine the exploitability when required. Once reaching interesting code locations (*e.g.*, concerned bugs), relevant path constraints are outputted. For example, to study the exploitability of an XSS vulnerability in a simple `echo $x` statement `echo $x`, the value of `$x` in `Memory` is collected for crafting attack input to launch the attacks [2, 35].

The output constraints describe the paths to specific program locations. The PHP user-defined functions have been analyzed and expanded before integrating into the constraints, therefore, the constraints we collect in PHP symbolic execution can be represented in Equation 1.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Term } t &:= c \mid v \mid f(t) \\ \text{Formula } F &:= \text{true} \mid \text{false} \mid t_1 \text{ op } t_2 \mid F_1 \text{ op } F_2 \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

The simplest formula is a term ( $t$ ), which can be either a constant value ( $c$ ), a symbolic variable ( $v$ ), or a PHP built-in function call ( $f(t)$ ). A formula can be further extended by performing a logical or arithmetic operation with another formula to generate a new formula. The formula system belongs to the standard first-order theory of equality with uninterpreted functions [40], which is applicable for the state-of-the-art solvers, *e.g.*, Z3 [21].

**5.2.3 Path Forking.** Conditional nodes always lead to different branches and paths. Thus we need to perform path forking. To collect constraints in different paths, we always break into the branches without considering the satisfiability of conditions at that moment. For path forking, we simply create a duplicate memory space (`Memory`) for the path to be executed next. The memory space is then garbage-collected after finishing exploring that path. The loops statements are only unrolled once and treated as `if` statements, which removes many paths that shall appear in dynamic symbolic execution tools. Such a path forking strategy is simple; some advanced methods can be applied to optimize the forking process [7].

**Summary.** Our symbolic execution is generic and can be applied to several tasks. We currently do not consider tackling other inherent challenges of symbolic execution (*e.g.*, path explosion) as they are orthogonal to our work in modeling built-in functions. In the example of Listing 1, it forks at the two `if` statements and explores three paths in total. It reasons about the sources of the values in the conditions, and replaces the variables in the conditions with the values in `Memory`. Therefore, the control flow constraint (`strtolower('phpbb_') . $_GET['uname']`) == 'phpbb\_root' && `$_GET['passwd']` == 'mypassword') is collected. For the data flow, the critical variable `$announcement` in the `echo` statement is combined with additional attack payloads to constitute the final data flow constraint, *e.g.*, (`$_GET['ann']`) == "alert('XXS')".

## 5.3 Cross-Language Integration

The PHP symbolic execution outputs the PHP constraints that are collected for certain analysis tasks. The constraints inherit some PHP language features that are not present in C. In particular, there are two issues we need to tackle: 1) *lack of type information*, and 2) *syntax inconsistency*. First, PHP is a dynamically typed programming language, where variables are initialized by assignment statements. However, C, a typical static programming language, requires all the variables and functions to be clearly declared before use. To synthesize a C program, we have to infer the variable types and declare them explicitly in the C code. Second, PHP and C are two completely different languages that define different operators and built-in functions. The operators in one language might not exist in another language. For example, PHP has the equality operator

(i.e., `==`) that compares only the values (but not types) of operands, which C does not naturally support.

We propose a type inference algorithm to fill the lack of type information, and a light-weight syntax mapping method to overcome the syntax inconsistency. With these techniques, we then synthesize a C program that equally represents the PHP constraints.

**5.3.1 Type Inference.** We perform type inference in the constraints to accurately determine variable types. Our algorithm is based on the fact that, although PHP variables can change their types through the execution, in a specific path, the variable types are determined by the execution context. The constraints we collect from PHP symbolic execution just describe such a context that limits the types of variables. Our type inference algorithm starts by collecting an initial set of types based on the operators and function signatures. Then, it employs an iterative algorithm to infer the types of remaining variables.

**Initial type inference based on operations.** The overall constraints represent the execution context of the variables, thus limit the legitimate types of variables. Locally, the operator behaves as the context of its operands. Thus the types of one operand can often be inferred based on the other operand or the corresponding operators. Besides, the function signatures describe the types of arguments and return values of their call sites. From the observation, we first decide operand types based on operators, and the types of argument and return values at call sites based on the function definitions. Certain operand types are only applicable to specific operators. For example, the addition operator (`+`) requires the operands to be numbers. Therefore, we identify its operands as of numeric type in the constraints. Similarly, the result of a concatenation operation (`.`) needs to be a string in PHP. Any variables that we cannot obtain their types from the first step are not restricted within the local operator context.

Second, after the first step, we consider the comparative operators such as `==`. We perform an overestimation that the operands are of the same type if allowed. This is sensible because: 1) these operands are free of the local context, and adding additional type information for variables with undetermined types (in the first step) does not invalidate the correctness of the syntax; and 2) a comparison usually targets variables of the same type in most of the uses. Therefore, we target a list of comparative operators and identify the types of their operands accordingly.

We apply the two-step procedure to each operation. We put the operand variables whose types are already inferred in the first step into a list,  $L$ . For those operators satisfied in the second step, we put the operand variables into a corresponding individual *type set*, which we will join through the following steps.

**Iterative type propagation.** We perform an iterative type inference by propagating the variables with known types in  $L$  to the remaining unknown variables in the type sets. Since the variables in one type set have the same type, we can infer the types of all other variables in the set if the type of one variable is already known. Therefore, for each variable with inferred type in  $L$ , we pop it from the list and propagate its type to other variables in the type sets that contain this variable. We also add the new variables which we just identify the types into the list  $L$ . We repeat this process till the list  $L$  is empty. In case there are any variables whose types cannot be

inferred, we set a default type of *string* as it is the most commonly used type in PHP programs, and continue the propagation process.

Using the control flow constraint in Listing 1 as an illustration example, in the constraint (`strtolower('phpbb_' . $_GET['uname']) == 'phpbb_root' && $_GET['passwd'] == 'mypassword'`), because of the concatenation operator, `$_GET['uname']` is inferred as in string type. Also from the function definition of `strtolower()`, its return value is inferred in string type as well. Because of the usage of equality operator (`==`) in `$_GET['passwd'] == 'mypassword'`, we obtain that `$_GET['passwd']` and string `'mypassword'` need to take the same type in the constraints, so we put them in a type set (`$_GET['passwd']`, `'mypassword'`). Accordingly, the type of `$_GET['passwd']` is inferred as string finally.

**5.3.2 Syntax Mapping.** We perform a light-weight syntax mapping to map the PHP operators in PHP constraints into their C implementations in the PHP interpreter. We consider the PHP operators, PHP type systems, and PHP built-in functions that appear in our constraint formula system (Equation 1).

PHP defines over 100 operators, including many advanced operators for facilitating server-side scripting. For example, a three-way operator spaceship (i.e., `<=>`) in PHP can perform greater than, less than, and equal comparisons between two operands. However, only fewer than 40 operators are defined in C. Thus we cannot simply map an operator in PHP to the one in C or vice versa. To address the first inconsistency, we alternatively choose to map all PHP operators into their original C implementations.

The PHP interpreter provides macro definitions for each specific operator and implements corresponding operator handlers. We add wrappers to allow calling these functions from external C programs. For example, the equality operator (i.e., `==`) is defined with a macro `IS_EQUAL`. Thus we define a wrapper function `php_is_equal(arg1, arg2)` that takes two arguments. Similar rule also applies to concatenation operation (`php_concat(arg1, arg2)`), and all other PHP operators. Because there are explicit macros and signatures for these functions, we can make it fully automated and scale to all PHP operators.

Besides the operators, we also do a similar type definition mapping, i.e., one PHP type can be directed to its original definition. We investigate the code parser of PHP interpreter and study how the initialized variables are represented in their C source code. We find that there is a general prototype data structure, `pval`, that is the overall carrier for most types of variable values. The different specifications of the fields in the `pval` can carry different types of variable values. For example, by specifying the `type` field to `IS_STRING`, we can use `strvalue` and `len` fields for strings. We thus wrap them into C language structures and allow directly declaring variable explicitly with these types, e.g., we define a type wrapper `php_string` over `pval` to allow declaring a PHP string type variable in C.

To include PHP built-in function into the analysis scope, we need to clean the implementations of built-in functions from complex inner APIs inside the PHP interpreter. Some functions use explicit ways to pass the arguments in their C implementations, e.g., `struct pval* is_int(struct pval)`, which can be easily handled. However, some functions do not accept arguments directly. Instead, they are provided with only the address of a hash table, which stores the real PHP arguments. For example, the PHP built-in function `strtolower()`

has the function signature of `strtolower(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS)`. The macro of `INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS` takes a pointer of hash tables to pass argument values. The special argument-fetching design requires the complex computation for obtaining and parsing the arguments in the hash table in built-in functions. To tackle this, we use another approach by allocating memory on the heap or the stack and passing the address as the hash table address for them. This is feasible because there are internal type-conversion functions in the PHP interpreter that can be leveraged to transform the data in memory into the anticipated argument types. Therefore, we apply such type-conversion functions to the allocated memory to convert the type to the anticipated type. With this, we can analyze the stand-alone behaviors of these PHP built-in functions.

## 5.4 Synthesizing C Programs

We synthesize a C program that equally represents the semantics of the PHP constraints and directly executes the C implementations of those PHP built-in functions. There are mainly three steps to synthesize a C program for our purpose.

First, we need to declare variable types before use. Based on the type inference step, we obtain the exact types of PHP variables in the PHP constraints. Since we already map the PHP type systems into their implementations and add wrappers for them, we can explicitly declare the necessary variables. For the synthesized C program (`syn_pro()`) in Listing 2, line 5-7 declares three variables as `php_string`. Note that an array element in the superglobal `$_GET` of PHP is transformed as a simple variable, e.g., `$_GET['uname']` turns to be `_GET_uname`. Second, we replace all the PHP operators with their wrappers above their C implementations by putting the operands as the arguments of the wrapper functions, e.g., `php_concat()` and `php_is_equal()`. Last, we construct the overall logic and finalize the C program synthesis, i.e., we include the C implementations of PHP built-in functions (line 2), represent the control flow and data flow constraints into the conditions of `if` statements (line 8-9), and synthesize an error that can be triggered when the conditions are met (line 10).

The type inference and type system mapping guarantee the correctness of basic C syntax. With the operator and built-in function mapping, the `if` statements in the synthesized C program can retain their functionalities as in PHP constraints. Once the synthesized error is triggered, the conditions in the `if` statements are definitely satisfied. In other words, the synthesized C program can equally represent the corresponding PHP constraints.

## 5.5 Symbolic Execution on Synthesized Programs

We perform symbolic execution on the synthesized C program. In this work, we use KLEE [13], a state-of-the-art and popular dynamic symbolic execution engine for LLVM IR. We first compile the synthesized C program together with the C implementations of PHP built-in functions into LLVM IR. We use the primitives of KLEE (e.g., `klee_make_symbolic()`) to declare variables as symbolic inputs, e.g., `_GET_uname`, that are to be solved. After that, we can symbolically execute the synthesized C program and invoke PHP built-in functions from their C implementations. The symbolic execution on the synthesized C program can determine the satisfiability of PHP

constraints by searching a path to reach the error we synthesize in the code. Taking advantage of the searching heuristic inside the symbolic execution, we turn the PHP constraint solving problem into a path searching problem. Thus we can automate the process of built-in function modeling for PHP symbolic execution.

Similar to directly using SMT solvers on constraints with manual models, the C symbolic execution is capable of giving a solution to the synthesized C program if it can find a satisfiable path to reach the error; an unsatisfiable decision will be given if the condition can never be satisfied; otherwise, the symbolic execution will keep running until it reaches the timeout. Because the synthesized C program are equally transformed from PHP constraints, the solutions can be naturally applied to the original PHP constraints and PHP programs.

## 6 IMPLEMENTATION

We implement the aforementioned methodology into XSYM and plan to release our prototype implementation. In particular, we implemented our PHP symbolic execution engine on top of the PHP-Parser [34] with about 7K LoC in PHP. We use the PHP-Parser to parse PHP source code into ASTs, and then construct control-flow graphs. To synthesize the C program, we automated the wrapper constructions with 2K LoC in Python and modified the PHP interpreter (v3.0.18) with 1.2K LoC in C. We modified KLEE [13] for analyzing the synthesized program with about 500 LoC in C++.

We integrate the synthesized program with the C implementations in PHP interpreter v3.0.18. We did not select the latest version of the PHP interpreter because KLEE is not able to well support the intrinsic functions in recent versions of PHP interpreters. In particular, the PHP interpreter had been re-engineered significantly. The compiled LLVM IR code of the latest versions includes a lot of architecture-dependent intrinsic functions that KLEE does not support. We do notice that the newer versions have introduced some but not many new functions. However, we observe that the basic definitions of most PHP operators, types, and built-in functions remain the same across PHP version updates. Therefore, we believe targeting a relatively older version of PHP is reasonable. Our methodology shall work for the newer versions of PHP as long as KLEE includes support for those intrinsic functions. Nevertheless, as we will demonstrate next, working on this version of PHP already allows us to achieve a good performance.

## 7 EVALUATION

In this section, we evaluate XSYM in three aspects: 1) *coverage*, 2) *correctness*, and 3) *application*. First, one major goal of XSYM is to automatically model PHP built-in functions. We measure how many built-in functions can be supported with our approach. Second, the correctness of the built-in function models is a key factor for ensuring the effectiveness of applications using them. We investigate how accurate our models are. Third, we study if XSYM can help develop better symbolic execution applications, e.g., exploit generation.

We first apply XSYM to model PHP built-in functions, and evaluate the function coverage in §7.2 and the correctness in §7.3. Next,

in §7.4, we demonstrate the efficacy of XSYM in exploiting real-world applications. Last, we characterize manual and automated methods in §7.5.

## 7.1 Experimental Setup

We specified XSYM to use Z3 SMT solver, and configured a 10-GB maximum memory usage and a 5-hour timeout. We conduct all the experiments on a server running Debian Stretch (Linux Kernel 4.9.0) with 96 GB RAM, and four 2.1 GHz Intel Xeon E5-2695 CPUs.

We systematically compare XSYM with the state-of-the-art PHP symbolic execution tool—Navex [2]. Though Navex had been open-sourced, unfortunately, the source code (for bug detection and constraint collection) is incomplete and no longer maintained. Our attempts failed to reach the authors. For a fair comparison, we could only use its constraint solving component—which is independent and includes their function models—for solving the same PHP constraints collected by XSYM. We evaluate the tools on the dataset used in [2]. It includes 1) popular and complex PHP applications such as Joomla, HotCRP, and WordPress, and 2) the same applications tested by other state-of-the-art tools in exploit generation (e.g., Chainsaw [1]) and vulnerability analysis (e.g., RIPS [19]).

## 7.2 Coverage

**7.2.1 In-scope Built-in Functions.** XSYM requires the source code of a program, and cannot model a function if not all its code is available. A common scenario is that a built-in function relies on some external modules of which the code is unavailable. For example, function `imap_check()` checks information from a mailbox, and relies on the external mail service. The version of PHP we use includes a total of 923 built-in functions, of which 603 rely on external modules. So we finally select 320 built-in functions for evaluation. We emphasize that, as shown in [20], this set has covered more than 90% of the most popular functions.

**7.2.2 Coverage for Built-in Functions.** XSYM achieves a high coverage. The evaluation results show XSYM is able to automatically model 287 functions. In contrast, Navex modeled only 35 built-in functions in their released source code. XSYM fails to support the rest functions for the following reasons: 1) implementation issues, and 2) implicit dependency issues. First, our current implementation of XSYM has some limitations inherited from KLEE. For example, KLEE does not support float point numbers and assembly code that are used in some built-in functions, such as the ones for mathematical calculations (e.g., `sin()`). Second, some functions have implicit dependencies with other functions, and require others to be called first (not internally called). For instance, function `get_magic_quotes_gpc()` gets the current configuration setting of `magic_quotes_gpc` in global variables which must be provided by an earlier function call. Since these prerequisite functions are not internally called, XSYM currently cannot identify such implicit dependency. 4 cases not supported by XSYM fall in this category.

## 7.3 Correctness

**7.3.1 Evaluation Method.** We evaluate the correctness of each individual built-in function. We separately synthesize PHP constraints and C program for each built-in function and then checking whether XSYM can produce correct solutions for that function to evaluate

```

1 // include built-in function
2 #include "php-built-in.h"
3
4 int syn_pro() {
5     php_string sol; //symbolic return value
6     if(php_is_equal(strtolower("TESTCASE"), sol) ) {
7         assert(0); // synthesized error
8     }
9 }

```

Listing 3: A synthesized C program for evaluating the correctness.

Table 1: Statistics of function accuracy.

Func. Types	# Func	# Tests	# Passed	Proportion
String	47	296	254	85.81%
Arithmetic	21	98	82	83.67%
Others	20	120	63	65.00%

its correctness. In detail, for each built-in function  $f(t)$ , we put the PHP constraint formula ( $f(\$t) == \$ret$ ) into the condition of an if statement, and similarly synthesize an error in the if body. To evaluate the PHP constrain formula (`strtolower("TESTCASE") == $sol`), we synthesize the C program in Listing 3. We try to symbolize either the arguments (`$t`) or the return variable (`$ret`), and query KLEE to solve. In the example, the `$sol` is to be symbolized and to be solved. KLEE might generate solutions for the symbolized variables in the constraints. A test would *pass* if the solution is correct; or *fail*, if KLEE is not able to give a solution or the solution is incorrect.

A constraint formula can have multiple solutions. This is because different arguments can result in the same return value for some functions, e.g., the formula (`strlen($str) == 1`) can have many possible values for `$str`. We separately execute the function concretely with the KLEE provided solutions and compare the concrete return values.

To pave the ground truth of the correctness, we leverage the test suite shipped with the PHP interpreter, which includes the expected return values for executing built-in functions with the provided concrete arguments.

**7.3.2 Results.** The evaluation results are shown in Table 1. Since string-related and arithmetical functions are the most prevalent in PHP, we divided these 287 functions into three classes: string-related functions, arithmetical functions, and the others. We observe that XSYM has a reasonably high accuracy. It passed 85.81% of the tests for string-related functions and 83.67% of the tests for arithmetical functions. It also passed 65.00% of tests in the others category. The results suggest that our automatic approach can correctly model the behavior of many built-in functions.

XSYM did not pass certain tests for the following reason. Symbolic execution cannot cover all paths for complex functions because of path explosion. Therefore, we cannot pass some test cases if the provided inputs traverse the paths not explored in symbolic execution. This is the inherent limitation of symbolic execution; however, this can be mitigated through dynamic state merging [32].

**Comparing with the state-of-the-art.** We also evaluate the correctness of manual models using the same method described above. Among 25 out of 35 PHP built-in functions that Navex manually supports, XSYM outperformed Navex by passing 48 more test cases.

For the rest functions, they are not directly compared because of the nature of functions and the different versions of PHP the two



tools modeled. In detail, four functions produce non-deterministic results. Thus, it is impossible to verify the correctness. Further, six functions were added to PHP since v5.4, which are not included in the version of PHP for which we automatically modeled.

**Summary.** We have two findings in the correctness evaluation. First, to a certain extent, modeling PHP built-in functions is a process of translating their behavior defined in one language to another language that is understandable by the solver. We find that some functions cannot be easily supported even by experts, because of the language feature inconsistency. Second, our analysis demonstrates the automated modeling of built-in functions can be much more accurate, compared to the manual modeling.


## 7.4 Vulnerability Detection

To understand how our automated models help security applications, we apply XSYM for the detection of SQL injection and cross-site scripting vulnerabilities, which are the dominant types of severe threats to server-side applications. We first perform a standard static taint analysis to identify the vulnerabilities, then use XSYM with Z3 to validate and exploit the vulnerabilities. We also ask Navex to solve the same set of constraints for comparison. The SMT solver may directly output an UNKNOWN decision for a constraint. We also set the output as UNKNOWN if the tool is unable to produce a decision within the time limit. Note that we do not investigate vulnerabilities depending on client-side code and the multiple-step nature of web applications, as they have been thoroughly studied in Navex [2] and are orthogonal to our work.

**7.4.1 Overall Results.** The evaluation results are shown in Table 2. We use the subscripts  $X$  and  $N$  to denote the results of XSYM and Navex, respectively. Sinks, Sol, Rep, and TP in the column headings mean the number of tainted sinks, solvable sinks (including both satisfiable and unsatisfiable), reported bugs by a tool and manually confirmed true-positive bugs, respectively. We also show the false positives in the parenthesis. As presented in the column Sinks, the taint analysis marked 172 SQLi and 139 XSS cases in 18 out of 26 applications. The results of the constraint solving for each tool are shown in the columns Sol and Rep in Table 2. A case is solvable if the SMT solver can give either a SAT or an UNSAT decision within the time limit; otherwise, it is unsolvable. XSYM solved 110 out of the 172 SQLi cases, and 95 out of the 139 XSS cases; and Navex solved 120 SQLi cases and 105 XSS cases. In our experiment, Navex triggered some syntax errors that violated SMT-LIB language specifications while analyzing 15 cases and reported them as unsolvable cases.

A case is considered as a positive by a tool if its constraint receives a SAT solution. In summary, XSYM identified 81/62 positive SQLi/XSS cases, and Navex reported 84/72 positive SQLi/XSS cases. Navex solved more constraints and reported more positive cases, which result from its overestimation and oversimplification of the constraint formulas (see §3). However, as we demonstrate next, Navex has a quite high number of false positives.

To evaluate the correctness of the constraint solving results, we manually analyzed all the vulnerable cases found in taint analysis and tested the solutions given by each tool. We present the true positive cases in the columns TP, and denote the false-positive cases in parentheses of columns Rep in Table 2. Both tools have false



**Figure 2: Distribution of vulnerability detection results. The alphabets (A-L) denote different situations. The numbers in parenthesis denote (number of cases including built-in functions supported by only XSYM/ total number of cases).**

positives (FP) and false negatives (FN): XSYM has 1/1 FP SQLi/XSS case, while Navex has 11/12 FP SQLi/XSS cases; XSYM has 7/6 FN SQLi/XSS cases, while Navex has 14/8 FN SQLi/XSS cases.

**7.4.2 Analysis.** To clearly understand the capability of each tool, we depict the distribution of results in Figure 2. We highlight the number of constraints including built-in functions supported by only XSYM as the first number in each parenthesis. Overall, 99 (31.83%) out of 311 sinks, and 66 (24.53%) out of 265 solvable constraints include such XSYM-only built-in functions. This demonstrates the support for more built-in functions is well needed. We next study different situations in detail.

**Solvable and unsolvable cases.** The majority of cases (A - D) are solvable by both XSYM and Navex. However, some cases (e.g., eight in D, 13 in J) contain XSYM-only built-in functions. Navex could “solve” such cases because it ignores those functions that it does not support by treating them as free symbols for compatibility reasons.

There exist many cases that are solvable by only one tool (e.g., Navex could not solve cases in E, F, and I but XSYM could), and even ones that neither tools can solve (e.g., the six in K). On the one hand, XSYM, as a general symbolic execution tool, suffers from path explosion problem as it turns the constraint solving problem into a path search problem. Thus, it cannot generate a solution within the time limit if one constraint is very complex. On the other hand, Navex cannot solve some complex cases as well, because the SMT solvers intrinsically suffer from also the excessively high computation complexity [23].

**True positives (TP) and true negatives (TN).** 128 cases in A were provided with a SAT solution by both tools. However, two solutions given by Navex were incorrect, and thus the corresponding two vulnerabilities were not really exploitable using the incorrect solutions. This is caused by the *functionality simplification* in Navex. Nine TP cases in F included XSYM-only functions and were solvable by only XSYM. Seven TP cases in H did not contain XSYM-only functions but were solvable only by Navex. We find that these seven constraints involved complex multiple-layer calls of built-in functions. Navex’s functionality simplification could reduce the complexity to some extent. In contrast, XSYM aimed to cover all the functionalities, and particularly suffered from the complexity problem.

XSYM and Navex reported the same TNs in D, but also different ones in I, and J, respectively. Especially, XSYM determined 10 TNs


**Table 2: Statistics of vulnerability detection for SQLi and XSS. Sinks, Sol, Rep, and TP denote the number of tainted sinks, solvable sinks (including satisfiable and unsatisfiable), reported bugs by a tool, and true-positive bugs, respectively. The subscripts  $X$  and  $N$  denote the results of XSYM and Navex. The numbers in parenthesis mean false positives.**

App	Files	LoC	SQLi						XSS					
			Sinks	Sol <sub>X</sub>	Sol <sub>N</sub>	Rep <sub>X</sub>	Rep <sub>N</sub>	TP	Sinks	Sol <sub>X</sub>	Sol <sub>N</sub>	Rep <sub>X</sub>	Rep <sub>N</sub>	TP
myBloggie (2.1.4)	56	9,090	25	12	12	7	7	7	2	2	2	1	1	2
WebChess (0.9)	29	5,219	13	6	8	4	7 (4)	5	16	11	12	8	9	8
WordPress (4.7.4)	699	181,257	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HotCRP (2.1)	145	57,717	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SchoolMate (1.5.4)	63	15,375	50	33	36	25	29 (4)	28	11	8	9	6	8 (2)	7
HotCRP (2.6.0)	43	14,870	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	4	2	3 (1)	2
Zen-Cart (1.5.5)	1,010	109,896	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Geccbblite (0.1)	11	323	4	3	3	3	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
OpenConf (6.71)	134	21,108	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
osCommerce (2.3.3)	541	49,378	1	1	1	1	0	1	47	28	33	18	21 (2)	21
osCommerce (2.3.4)	684	63,631	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	3	3	2	2	2
Drupal (8.3.2)	8,626	585,094	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
WeBid (0.5.4)	300	65,302	43	38	39	29 (1)	26 (2)	30	13	10	8	4	4	5
Gallery (3.0.9)	510	39,218	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scarf Beta	19	978	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	2	2	2	2	2
DNScript	60	1,322	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Joomla (3.7.0)	2,764	302,701	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FAQForge (1.3.2)	17	1,676	17	5	8	3	4	4	7	4	4	3	3	3
LimeSurvey (3.1.1)	3,217	965,164	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Collabtive (3.1)	836	172,564	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eve (1.0)	8	905	5	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Elgg (2.3.5)	3,201	215,870	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CPG (1.5.46)	359	305,245	3	2	3	2	2	2	11	7	9	5	5 (1)	6
MediaWiki (1.30.0)	3,680	537,913	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
PHPBB (3.0.11)	74	29,164	4	3	3	3	3 (1)	3	16	13	16	8 (1)	11 (6)	7
PHPBB (3.0.23)	387	158,756	5	4	4	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	27,473	3,909,736	172	110	120	81 (1)	84 (11)	87	139	95	105	62 (1)	72 (12)	68

in C, which were wrongly classified as positives by Navex. All these 10 cases included XSYM-only functions, which XSYM was able to correctly model their functionalities and accordingly generated the correct UNSAT decisions. In contrast, Navex incorrectly relaxed the constraint for compatibility and generated incorrect SAT decisions.

**False positives (FP).** XSYM had two FPs in E. We found in our analysis that these two constraints included calls of *uninterpreted* user-defined functions, of which the PHP source code was not available. Accordingly, XSYM had to replace them with free symbols for generating solutions, which were wrong. This is a well-known challenge in PHP program analysis [2, 5], but not a limitation of our automated modeling approach. Navex had 23 FPs. The reasons for the 12 FPs in A and C have been discussed above. The other 11 FPs in G were also caused by its *constraint relaxation*. The results suggest that Navex could have generated more accurate results if more built-in functions were supported.

**False negatives (FN).** As explained earlier, XSYM had six FNs in K and seven FNs in H that it could not solve. Similarly, Navex had 15 FNs in K and F that it could not solve. Particularly, four cases in B that Navex solved were FNs, because of the *functionality simplification* in its models. For example, Navex only modeled a subset of the entire functionalities of certain built-in functions, while the satisfiable functionalities were not included. Therefore, the underlining SMT solver was unable to satisfy the whole constraints. On the contrary, XSYM was able to generate the correct exploits because of its correct and complete modeling of these functions.



**Figure 3: Number of solved bugs over time for XSYM and Navex**

**Summary.** XSYM and Navex can solve the majority of reported cases, and exploit most true positive cases. Compared with Navex, XSYM has a lower false-positive rate and a lower false-negative rate. Navex, because of its *constraint relaxation* and *functionality simplification*, produces wrong decisions or solutions for 27 cases, while XSYM has only two.

**7.4.3 Performance.** As we already specified the maximum memory usage to 10 GB for both tools, here we only measure the time usage in them. Specifically, for all solvable cases, we present the numbers of solved cases over time in Figure 3. From the figure, we observe that, more than half of the cases were solved in the first 100 minutes, and no more cases were solved after 210 minutes. This suggests that the timeout of 5 hours is sufficient to evaluate both tools in our settings. As a comparison, XSYM has a relatively longer time

requirement than Navex. Again, higher efficiency with Navex is a result of its manual over-approximation, which however sacrifices accuracy.

## 7.5 Characterizing Manual and Automated Modeling Methods

A manual method is usually *modeled on demand* and *specialized*. It focuses on a relatively small set of built-in functions that are usually required for certain analysis tasks. Due to the unaffordable manual effort and complex logic, manual modeling typically cannot cover all built-in functions or provide accurate results. That said, we found that a manual method can specialize the features to meet their needs like functionality simplification. However, this can bring side-effects, for example, the wrong solutions. It also makes use of the SMT-LIB built-in functions to assist their implementations. By contrast, our automated method is with a high *coverage*, *correctness*, and *completeness*. Our automated method can scale to a large number of built-in functions and manage an acceptable accuracy. Our automated method considers the entire function semantics, and is more complete. However, compared with the manual models using *functionality simplification*, it results in higher analysis complexity. Therefore, only the shadow (paths) functionalities can be explored and modeled.

We further find that manual and automated methods can complement each other. For those frequently-invoked built-in functions, manual methods can be leveraged to specialize them with the best efforts for the analysis tasks. For other relatively less used built-in functions, our automated model can scale to support them with basic functionalities. We suggest to further combine them together.

Our automated modeling can be used as a possible means to verify the correctness of manual methods. As discussed earlier, our automated method has a high accuracy and high true positive reports, and it can solve most of the cases that the manual method can solve. Therefore, it can be a feasible way to help verify the decisions and solutions given by the manual methods.

## 8 DISCUSSION

**Built-in functions dependent on external modules.** Our automated method requires all the code to be available. Built-in functions that rely on external modules such as operating systems and database systems can not be directly supported when the code of the external modules are not in our analysis scope. We can also try to solve this problem by including the code of external modules in our analysis scope. For example, S2E [18] adopts the whole-system symbolic execution to cover all involved modules. However, potential challenges in whole-system symbolic execution include that it has to analyze binary code (when the source code is not available) and that it may not scale well. We believe that the approach of XSYM is generic, and supporting external modules is an orthogonal topic.

**Combining automated and manual methods.** Our methodology uses a C symbolic execution tool (*i.e.*, KLEE) to analyze the synthesized C program. To integrate the manual modeling into our automated modeling, we may have to redirect the function calls to such manually modeled functions to their manual models, and seamlessly integrate the manual models into the execution context

in the C symbolic execution. As a result, this might require some enhancement on the underlying C symbolic execution tool. We leave it as our future work.

## 9 RELATED WORK

**Symbolic execution.** Symbolic execution has been widely used for web security. SAFELI [24] performs symbolic execution on the instrumented bytecode of Java-based web applications for SQLi scanning. Kudzu [41], a JavaScript symbolic execution framework, was proposed to study the client-side vulnerabilities. Differently, XSYM targets server-side PHP applications. Apollo [3] and Navex [2] use concolic execution for test generation. They either instrument the Zend engine or use xdebug to get runtime information for constraint solving. Compared with XSYM, they rely on analysts to translate PHP built-in functions into the SMT-LIB language, which is found to be error-prone.

**Program synthesis.** Program synthesis as the task of generating programs from user intent, has been widely used for studying security problems [27]. Singularity [46] transforms the complexity testing problem to optimal program synthesis to identify performance bugs. Aspire [16] synthesizes application specifications from input-output examples to meet user intent and to guarantee the security. Many fuzzing works [29, 33, 37] use the language syntax to synthesize code fragments as test cases. However, XSYM applies a program synthesis method to construct automated models for PHP built-in functions.

**The modeling of built-in functions.** Analyzing built-in functions is also common in static analysis. Pixy [31] configures 29, and RIPS [19] classifies and analyzes over 900 built-in functions in static analysis for taint propagation and sanitization. In symbolic execution and test generation, SMART [25] proposes a summary to describe the behaviors of a function, but it only targets C applications instead of PHP applications that involve cross-language features. DART [38] isolates library functions from the whole constraints and concretely executes these library functions to mitigate the built-in function problem for Java programs. Godefroid records concrete input-output pairs for uninterpreted built-in functions and reuses them in constraint solving [26]. However, they can only cover a very few function situations. Tools like Chainsaw [1], Navex [2], and UChecker [30] that manually model built-in functions are shown to be error-prone. In comparison, XSYM employs symbolic execution on C implementations of PHP built-in functions to automatically model their behaviors.

## 10 CONCLUSION

Modeling built-in function for symbolic execution is important. In this paper, we explored the feasibility of automatically modeling PHP built-in functions for PHP symbolic execution. We proposed a cross-language program synthesis method that transforms relevant constraints collected in PHP symbolic execution into a C-compliant program and integrates with the C implementations of PHP built-in functions. We then leveraged a C symbolic execution tool to analyze the synthesized program, which achieved the goal of automating built-in function modeling. Our evaluation shows that the automated method is scalable and accurate. With it, we successfully exploited 141 vulnerabilities in 26 real-world web applications.

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